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Abstract 
 
Online auctions are highly susceptible to fraud. 
Shill bidding is where a seller introduces fake bids into 
an auction to drive up the final price. If the shill 
bidders are not detected in run-time, innocent bidders 
will have already been cheated by the time the auction 
ends. Therefore, it is necessary to detect shill bidders 
in real-time and take appropriate actions according to 
the fraud activities. This paper presents a real-time 
shill bidding detection algorithm to identify the 
presence of shill bidding in multiple online auctions. 
The algorithm provides each bidder a Live Shill Score 
(LSS) indicating the likelihood of their potential 
involvement in price inflating behavior. The LSS is 
calculated based on the bidding patterns over a live 
auction and past bidding history. We have tested our 
algorithm on data obtained from a series of realistic 
simulated auctions and also commercial online 
auctions. Experimental results show that the real-time 
detection algorithm is able to prune the search space 
required to detect which bidders are likely to be 
potential shill bidders. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
An online auction provides ease, comfort and a 
convenient trading environment to its users. Therefore, 
online auctions are extremely popular for sellers and 
buyers. eBay and Yahoo! Auctions are amongst the 
most popular online auction sites [10]. In the first 
quarter of 2017, ebay alone has 169 million active 
users after exceeding 167 million active users by the 
end of 2016 [21].   
However, despite the overwhelming benefits of 
online auctions, they are attractive to fraudsters. Online 
auction fraud is one of the fastest growing forms of 
Internet-based crime. The U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 
reveals that approximately 42 thousand auction-related 
fraud complaints were received from June 1, 2014 to 
December 31, 2014 [22]. Moreover, the latest report of 
IC3 has found that auction related complaints are still 
ranking at the top of the complaints list with 
approximately 116,292 complaints in 2015 [23]. As 
participants are anonymous, both sellers and bidders 
can be involved in fraudulent activities. One of the 
most common types of online auction fraud is shill 
bidding. 
Shill bidding is the act of introducing false bids into 
an auction on behalf of the seller to artificially raise the 
item’s price so that legitimate bidders must pay more 
in order to win [14, 15]. The presence of shill bidding 
also diminishes the reputation of the auction houses as 
bidders will be reluctant to participate if they feel there 
is the possibility of being ripped-off by a seller. Shill 
bidding is difficult to detect because: (i) any user can 
register under false identity; and (ii) multiple users can 
form a collusive bidding group to evade detection. 
Furthermore, it is not easy to prove that someone is 
indeed guilty of shill bidding.  
Shill bidding detection and prevention mechanisms 
have been proposed by researchers [1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 
15-18]. There is now common consensus of the 
common strategies shill bidders behave in.  However, 
most of these efforts focus on examining bidding 
patterns once an auction has terminated – as such an 
innocent bidder has already incurred loss as a result of 
the shill bidding.  More recently, proposals have been 
made to detect shill bidding in real-time [3, 10, 12, 13, 
20].  The idea being that actions can be taken while an 
auction is currently underway in order to warn/deter 
shill bidding activity, or prevent the auction from 
completing if serious price inflating behavior is being 
detected. 
This paper proposes a real-time detection algorithm 
for shill bidders in multiple auctions. The algorithm 
splits a live auction into four time periods and 
examines a bidder’s bidding behaviors during each 
period. A Live Shill Score (LSS) is calculated for each 
bidder during each of these periods based on the 
bidding behaviors of the bidder in the live auction and 
his/her past bid history. The auctioneer then notifies 
legitimate bidders and/or takes necessary actions 
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against suspected shill bidders based on the LSS. We 
have implemented the algorithm and undertaken 
preliminary tests on simulated data and commercial 
auction data. Experimental results show that the 
algorithm can detect potential shill bidders in multiple 
auctions and take necessary actions to them in run-
time.   
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives 
a background on real-time shill detection approaches 
and the problem motivation for our research; Section 3 
presents our proposed LSS algorithm for real-time 
detection of shill bidding in multiple auctions; and also 
discusses the calculation procedure of LSS for each 
bidder during a live auction. Section 4 shows our 
experimental setup and preliminary results. Finally 
Section 5 provides concluding remarks and avenues for 
future work. 
 
2. Background and Problem Motivation  
 
This section describes some existing shill bidding 
detection techniques and the motivation of our research 
on combating shill bidding fraud in online auctions.  
 
2.1. Related Work 
 
Commercial online auctions (such as eBay) claim 
to monitor their auctions for shill bidding.  However, 
they do not disclose how their shill detection methods 
operate, nor do they publicly acknowledge when shill 
bidding has been occurring in their auctions.  This may 
be due to fear of lost business should people learn the 
true extent of shill bidding and how much it is costing 
legitimate bidders. Furthermore, some unscrupulous 
auctioneers might actually benefit from inflated prices 
where there is a commission payable based on the final 
price. 
There are two distinct approaches in scientific 
literature on shill bidding detection: (i) Offline (or 
static) method which runs after an auction has 
terminated, or; (ii) Real-time (or dynamic) method 
which operates while an auction is in-progress. 
Among the offline approaches, Trevathan and Read 
[15] present an algorithm to determine the degree of 
shill bidding in online auctions. The algorithm 
observes the bidding patterns of each bidder over a 
series of auctions held by a specific seller and 
calculates a Shill Score for each bidder [15]. The Shill 
Score is used to indicate the likelihood of the user 
being a potential shill bidder [15]. Bidders can observe 
other bidders’ Shill Scores and decide whether they 
want to participate in the particular seller’s auction 
[15]. However, the algorithm works only when an 
auction ends. 
Xu et al. [20] analyse some shill bidding patterns 
and introduce a Dynamic Auction Model (DAM) to 
detect shill bidding in real-time. Their proposed 
approach employs three sources: (i) The auction model 
which is updated dynamically when new bids arrive; 
(ii) Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas represent 
the shill bidding patterns; and (iii) A Simple Promela 
INterpreter (SPIN) model checker that checks whether 
the LTL formulas are violated or not [20]. 
Nevertheless, the problem of this approach is that 
monitoring an auction after every single submitted bid 
may make the detection process computationally 
intensive, which is not practical when there are a large 
number of participants. 
In contrast, Ford et al. [3] present a real-time 
classifier that identifies suspicious shill bidders based 
on a neural network method. The neural network is 
initialized with a training sample and is then updated 
incrementally to adapt to new bidding data in real-time 
[3]. However, manually labelling the large training 
dataset of users is inefficient. 
Mamun and Sadaoui [10] propose software 
architecture to protect auction systems from shill 
bidders in online auctions. They claim that their 
proposed mechanism keeps the auction system secure 
from auction fraud and also maintains trust among 
users and the online auction system [10]. However, the 
paper continually mentions an IP tracker that tracks the 
IP addresses of sellers and bidders. However, the 
authors do not actually discuss how to implement IP 
tracker for testing the proposed system. Furthermore, 
they do not test the effectiveness of their proposal. 
Sadaoui et al. [12] propose a generic framework 
that covers real-time monitoring of multiple live 
auctions. This framework observes the running 
auctions, takes actions in real-time and prevents shill 
bidders from succeeding [12]. The authors state that 
real-time monitoring processes a smaller number of 
bids rather than offline processing [12]. This suggests 
their proposed system can react quicker to the potential 
shill bidders. However, their approach is a combination 
of the offline approach with an online approach. 
Therefore, claims about the speed of their proposal are 
contradictory. Moreover, they do not address collusion 
among bidders and/or sellers. 
Later Sadaoui et al. [13] propose runtime stage-
based monitoring system that detects in-auction fraud 
by monitoring each bidder’s stage activities in ongoing 
auctions. It then takes immediate action by warning 
dishonest bidders and cancelling the suspected auctions 
after detecting abnormal activities in ongoing auctions 
[13]. However, the authors do not justify the reason for 
selecting eight bidding behaviors among 17 proposed 
suspicious bidding patterns. 
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2.2. Problem Motivation 
 
Considering the limitations of the existing literature 
on shill bidding detection, it is necessary to revise the 
existing shill detection methods to detect shill bidding 
before any payment.  This approach will potentially 
prevent monetary loss for victims. Moreover, it is 
preferable to detect and stop shill bidders from 
undertaking shill bidding in the run-time rather than 
detect it afterwards. 
The research questions we are seeking to address 
are as follows: 
(i) How will the proposed shill bidding detection 
method be able to deter shill bidders in real-time? 
(ii) What are the typical shill bidding patterns that can 
be used in determining whether shill bidding is 
happening in real-time? 
(iii) What are the consequences for taking disciplinary 
actions against a shill bidder after detecting his/her 
involvement in a particular live auction? 
 
3. Methodology  
 
Our shill detection methodology considers bidding 
properties while an auction is currently in progress. We 
propose a Live Shill Score (LSS) that represents a 
bidder’s bidding behavior during a live auction. The 
LSS is calculated for each bidder based upon a 
selection of bidding behaviors/characteristics and the 
bidder’s past bid history. The LSS can be used to 
potentially identify shill bidders, and enforce 
disciplinary action during an auction.  
 
3.1. Assumptions 
 
To develop our LSS algorithm, we make the 
following assumptions: 
 
(i) There is one shill bidder; 
(ii) There are multiple auctions (one live auction and 
rest of them are past auctions); and 
(iii) There is one seller (note that the seller is not the 
same entity as the auctioneer). 
Our proposed algorithm is not addressing situations 
where there are concurrent auctions running for the 
same item (as in [19]). 
 
3.2. Monitoring Stages of a Live Auction 
 
A shill bidder submits bids at certain times 
throughout the auction which can be deliberated more 
conducive to price inflating behavior. For instance, it 
becomes more unsafe for shill bidders to submit fake 
bids closer to the end of an auction as there is an 
increased possibility that the shill bidder will win the 
auction if he/she is not outbid in time. Therefore, our 
proposed LSS algorithm splits an auction into a series 
of stages depending on the time elapsed for reacting to 
a shill bidder and other legitimate bidders in real-time. 
This strategy was first suggested in Xu et al.’s real-
time shill detection proposal [20]. The different auction 
stages are as follows: 
 
(i) Early Stage – This is the first quarter of the 
auction duration (up to 25% of the auction 
duration). A shill bidder usually submits bids 
early in an auction to encourage legitimate 
bidders to enter higher bids in order to win. 
(ii) Middle Stage – This is the time period between 
25.1% and 80% of the auction duration. A shill 
bidder places most of his/her bids in this stage. 
(iii) Late Stage – The next 15% (between 80.1% and 
95%) of the auction is the late stage. A shill 
bidder tries to avoid placing bids during this 
period to reduce his/her chance of winning the 
auction. 
 
In our real-time shill bidding detection 
methodology, we consider the above stages for 
monitoring shill bidding patterns in a live auction. 
However, we differ from Xu et. al [19, 20] by 
introducing an additional stage, referred to as the Final 
stage: 
 
(iv) Final Stage – The last 5% of the auction duration 
is used for verifying the detected bidding patterns 
from the early, middle and late stages. The overall 
LSS of each bidder in the auction will be 
calculated during this stage. 
 
The reason for the final stage is that Xu et. al [20] 
did not clearly address when reactions would be taken 
against the potential shill bidders after the end of the 
late stage. Therefore, the final stage is required for 
taking appropriate actions against potential shill 
bidders after the late stage and for exonerating bidders 
with good behavior. 
 
3.3. The Real-Time Shill Bidding Detection 
Process 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the process for real-time shill 
bidding detection in multiple auctions. Time flows 
from left to right. 
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Figure 1: Real-time shill bidding detection process 
in multiple auctions. 
 
A live auction is split into the four aforementioned 
stages (i.e., early, middle, late, final). Each bidder’s 
behavior is examined against other bids which are 
placed by the bidder during each auction stage. We 
also consider the bidder’s past bidding history for 
calculating each bidder’s LSS.  An LSS for each bidder 
is calculated during each respective auction stage. The 
LSS for each bidder in a particular auction stage is as 
follows: 
 
(i) LSSearly – After completing 25% of auction 
duration, LSSearly is calculated based on the 
bidding behavior of each bidder during the early 
stage of the live auction and past bidding history 
of the bidder. 
(ii) LSSmiddle – The value of LSSmiddle is calculated 
after completing the middle stage of the auction 
duration. The calculation of LSSmiddle is based on 
the bidding behavior of each bidder during the 
middle stage of the live auction and past bidding 
history of the bidder. 
(iii) LSSlate – LSSlate is calculated after completing the 
late stage. The calculation of LSSlate is based on 
the bidding behavior of each bidder during the 
late stage of the live auction and past bidding 
history of the bidder. 
(iv) LSS – LSS is calculated based on the bidding 
behaviors of all bidders throughout the entire 
auction and the bidding behavior of the bidders in 
past auctions.  
 
A high value of a bidder’s LSS indicates the 
increased likelihood the bidder is engaging in price 
inflating behavior. At the end of the auction, a bidder’s 
overall LSS is stored into the database. 
 
3.4. Reactions to shill bidders 
 
After every stage of the auction, the algorithm will 
determine whether any action is required based on the 
bidding behavior so far in the auction. Apart from Xu 
et al. [19, 20], to our knowledge there is no literature 
discussing potential penalties or the impact of these 
penalties on bidders’ bidding behavior. We propose the 
following penalties for our algorithm: 
 
(i) Penalty 1 (At the end of the early stage) – Send 
a warning message to the suspected bidders. This 
penalty encourages honest bidders to continue 
bidding without causing anxiety. A potential shill 
bidder would also realize that the auction is being 
monitored, thereby forcing him/her to rethink 
his/her behavior. 
(ii) Penalty 2 (At the end of the middle stage) – 
Postpone the auction temporarily; notify all 
participating bidders about the suspicious 
activity; and also ask suspicious bidders and/or 
the seller to show cause for why the auction 
should continue. This penalty has a stronger 
psychological impact on auction participants. The 
penalty sends a message that the auction is 
potentially at risk of shill bidding. Therefore, 
everyone is on notice to improve their behavior. 
At this point, honest bidders can decide whether 
they want to remain involved with the auction or 
not. On the other hand, the suspicious bidders 
and/or seller would realize that they need to 
improve their behavior. Otherwise the postponed 
auction will not be reopened. 
(iii) Penalty 3 (At the end of the late stage) – Stop 
the current auction permanently. This penalty also 
limits the privileges of the suspicious account 
when couple of offences occurred. For example, 
feedback rating of a shill bidder can be reduced as 
it is an important part of eBay community to 
evaluate a seller’s reputation. This penalty 
informs honest bidders this is a monitored and 
safe bidding system. The suspicious bidders 
and/or seller would realize that they need not only 
to show their good behavior to run auctions in 
future but also to get back good reputation. 
Otherwise he/she will not be able to list any 
auction further. The penalty reduces the potential 
for monetary loss. 
(iv) Reward/Penalty 4 (At the end of the final 
stage) – Suspend the suspected account 
permanently if it shows repeated behaviors in 
multiple live auctions. In addition, bidders whose 
behavior appears to be normal are exonerated 
(i.e., the winner of the auction, late bidders, bid 
snipers). 
 
In addition, there can be some economic penalties 
for the potential shill bidders. 
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3.5. Shill bidding behaviors 
 
There are many shill bidding strategies found in 
past studies. We identified the seven most popular shill 
bidding characteristics based on an analysis of the 
literature [9]. 
Table 1 shows the bidding behaviors with the 
corresponding ratings considered for our LSS 
algorithm. Among the seven bidding patterns [9], 
‘early bidding’ and ‘last/late bidding’ indicate the same 
bidding characteristic.   Therefore, we consider ‘early 
bidding’ in our LSS algorithm.  
 
Table 1: Bidding behavior for real-time detection of 
shill bidding 
 
Rating Bidding Behaviors 
α Affinity to a seller 
β Bid frequency 
γ Win/lose factor 
δ Rapid outbid time 
ε Small bid increment 
ζ Early bidding 
 
Table 2: Bidding behaviors at each auction stage 
 
Stages Bidding Behaviors 
Early Stage 
Middle Stage 
Late Stage 
Affinity to a seller (α rating) 
Bid frequency (β rating) 
Rapid outbid time (δ rating) 
Small bid increment (ε rating) 
Early bidding (ζ rating) 
Final Stage Affinity to a seller (α rating) 
Bid frequency (β rating) 
Win/Lose factor (γ rating) 
Rapid outbid time (δ rating) 
Small bid increment (ε rating) 
Early bidding (ζ rating) 
 
Table 2 shows the bidding behaviors considered at 
different stages (i.e., early, middle, late and final stage) 
for calculating the LSS of each bidder in a live auction. 
The following bidding characteristics are considered 
for calculating LSSearly, LSSmiddle, and LSSlate for each 
bidder in a live auction: 
 
(i) Affinity to a seller (α rating) – A shill bidder 
usually participates in auctions run by one 
particular seller. A bidder with a high α rating is 
suspicious to be a shill bidder.  
Suppose  auctions held by a seller. To calculate 
α rating, we count the number of the seller’s 
auctions, , bidder  has participated in. Then, α 
rating of bidder  can be calculated as follows: 
 = ( − ) 
 	; 							0	 ≤ 	 	≤ 1 
where  	represents the number of auctions 
bidder 	participated in run by a seller and 	  
denotes the number of auctions bidder 	won. In 
general, α rating will be high for a shill bidder. 
 
(ii) Bid frequency (β rating) – β rating indicates the 
average percentage of bids that a bidder has 
submitted throughout a particular stage of the live 
auction and over the past auctions he/she had 
participated in.  
For calculating the β rating, we count the number 
of auctions,		, a bidder  has participated in. 
Suppose  is the set of auction numbers. The β 
rating of bidder  across all auctions,  ∈ 	, can 
be calculated as follows: 
													 =  0,  = 01  ∈ , ℎ 	; 	0	 ≤ 	
 	≤ 1 
where  denotes the number of bids placed by 
bidder 	in auction  and  is the total number of 
bids placed by all bidders in auction . In general, 
the β rating will be high for a shill bidder 
compared to a legitimate bidder. 
 
(iii) Rapid outbid time (δ rating) – A shill bidder 
gives more time to legitimate bidder for 
responding on his/her fake bids. Therefore, a shill 
bidder submits a new bid within a small time 
period of a genuine bid. This behavior denotes δ 
rating which can be measured by observing inter 
bid times for all bidders. The average inter bid 
time is found for each bidder across a particular 
stage of the live auction and the past auctions 
he/she had participated in. Bidders who wait 
longer between bids have a lower average inter 
bid time score. 
For calculating the δ rating, we count the number 
of auctions,	, a bidder  has participated in. 
Suppose  is the set of auction numbers. The δ 
rating of bidder  across all auctions,	 ∈ 	, can 
be calculated as follows: 
 
(a) We calculate the inter bidding time for each 
bid, !, submitted by bidder  in auction : ∆,# = $ 0, ! = 1,# − ,#	, ! > 1, ! ∈ & 
where ,#'( is the time of a previous bid 
submitted by a rival bidder. Note that, & be 
the bid numbers (e.g. 1st bid, 2nd bid, etc) in 
auction  and )&) = . 
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(b) Then, we calculate the average inter bidding 
time for bidder  in auction : * = (+, ∑ ∆#∈.,   
where & is the bid numbers of bidder  in 
auction . 
 
So, the final δ rating of any bidder  over all 
auctions participated in: 
* = 1 − / 1  *∈ 0 ; 							0	 ≤ 	 * 	≤ 1 
In general, the  * rating will be higher for a shill 
bidder in comparison to a legitimate bidder. 
 
(iv) Small bid increment (ε rating) – A shill bidder 
outbids a legitimate bid by a large amount will 
increase the risk of losing an auction [8]. 
Therefore, a shill bidder tends to only bid the 
minimal amount to stay ahead of the leading bid. 
This behavior denotes ε rating which can be 
measured by observing inter bid increments for 
all bidder. The average inter bid increment is 
found for each bidder across a particular stage of 
the live auction and the past auctions he/she had 
participated in. Bidders who place bids smaller 
bid increments have a lower average inter bid 
increment score. 
For calculating the ε rating, we count the number 
of auctions,	, a bidder  has participated in. 
Suppose  is the set of auction numbers. The ε 
rating of bidder  across all auctions,  ∈ 	, can 
be calculated as follows: 
 
(a) We calculate the inter bid increments for 
each bid, !, submitted by bidder  in auction : ∆1,# = $ 0, ! = 11,# − 1,#, ! > 1, ! ∈ &	 
where 1,#'( is the price of a previous bid 
submitted by a rival bidder. 
(b) Then, we calculate the average inter bid 
increment for bidder  in auction : 2 = (+, ∑ ∆1#∈.,   
where & is the bid numbers of bidder  in 
auction . 
So, the final ε rating of any bidder  over all 
auctions participated in: 
2 = 1 − / 1  2∈ 0 ; 							0	 ≤ 	 2 	≤ 1 
In general, the ε rating will be higher for a shill 
bidder in comparison to a legitimate bidder. 
 
(v) Early bidding (ζ rating) – If a shill bidder bids 
towards the end of an auction, he/she risks of 
losing the auction by not being outbid in time. 
Therefore, a shill bidder tries to bid early in an 
auction as it is less risky and maximizes the 
amount of influence the shill has over an auction. 
The ζ rating denotes how early in an auction a 
bidder commenced bidding.  
To calculate the ζ rating of a bidder	, we count 
the number of auctions,	, the bidder  has 
participated in. Suppose  is the set of auction 
numbers. The ζ rating of bidder  across all 
auctions,  ∈ 	, can be calculated as follows: 
We calculate the difference between auction ’s 
starting time,	, and the time, ,#3  of the first bid 
placed by bidder  in auction . 4 = 	,#3 	–  
Finally, we calculate the average of the final bid 
time differences for bidder  over all auctions 
participated in: 4 = 1 − 1  4∈ ; 							0	 ≤ 	 4 	≤ 1 
In general, the ζ rating will be high for a shill 
bidder. 
We consider the following additional bidding 
behavior for calculating the overall LSS at the end of a 
live auction: 
 
(vi) Win/lose factor (γ rating) – A shill bidder avoids 
wining an auction, as the auction will have to be 
repeated. A bidder with a low γ rating indicates 
suspicious behavior. It can be mentioned that a 
winner of an auction is not a shill bidder.  A 
bidder  who has won  	auctions, the γ rating of 
the bidder  is calculated as follows: γ = 1 −	6 
 7 ; 							0	 ≤ 	γ 	≤ 1 
In general, a shill bidder will have a high γ rating. 
 
3.6. Calculation of the LSS 
 
After calculating α, β, δ, ε, ζ, and γ ratings in a 
particular stage of auction duration, then we can 
calculate the value LSS after completing every stage 
(see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: LSS calculation process 
 
In the early stage, LSSearly is calculated as follows: 899:;<=> = ?@AB?CDEFGHIB	?JKEFGHIB?LMEFGHIB?NOEFGHI?@B	?CB	?J	B	?LB	?N	 	P 10       (1) 
At the middle stage, LSSmiddle is calculated as follows:  
899QRR=: 
?@AB	?CDSTTHEB	?JKSTTHEB?LMSTTHEB?NOSTTHE
?@B	?CB	?J	B	?LB	?N		
	P 10	            (2)       
At the late stage, LSSlate is calculated as follows: 
899=;U: 
?@AB	?CDHFVEB	?CKHFVEB?JMHFVEB?LOHFVE
?@B	?CB	?J	B	?LB	?N	
	P 10               (3)              
At the final stage, LSS is calculated as follows: 
899 
?@AB	?CDB	?JKB?LMB?NOB	?WX
?@B	?CB	?J	B	?LB?NB	?W
	P 10                      (4) 
 
where Y is the weighted coefficient associated with 
each rating in Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4). The 
weights used in this paper are: Y( = 9, YZ = 2, Y[ = 2, Y\ 
= 2, Y] = 2, and Y^ = 5. These weightings are obtained 
by experimenting with simulated auction data and also 
by looking at historical commercial auction data.  Note 
that it is difficult to calibrate weightings from known 
auctions that contain shill bidding as such data is 
extremely limited (due to non-disclosure by 
commercial auctioneers). We chose the weightings 
using the following justifications: 
A bidder’s  rating receives the highest weighting. 
This is done to count one-time bidders who participate 
most of auctions run by a particular seller and always 
submitted bid in the early and middle stages of an 
auction. 
A bidder’s _ rating is given the next highest 
weighting because it is the strongest sign that the 
winner of the auction is not a shill bidder.  
The next significant factors are the β, δ, ε, ζ ratings. 
These factors are used to see if the bidding behavior 
matches a shill bidder’s behavior. A bidder’s  rating 
will be high for an aggressive shill bidder or low for 
one-time bidder. It may happen that a one-time bidder 
submits bid most of the auctions either early or middle 
stage of the auction duration. As a result, the  rating 
can present mixed results depending on the type of 
shill behavior employed. For this reason, the 	 rating 
is given a lower weighting to consider both type of 
bidders. 
The  *  and  2 weightings receive lower rating than 
 and _  weightings because of the effect of one-time 
bidders. That is, if a bidder only bids once at any stages 
of a live auction, submitting the bid quickly just after 
the current highest bid and by minimal amount 
required, then the bidder will have high  * and  2 
ratings. As the bidder does not bid again, his/her * and 
2 ratings will always remain high and not average 
down if the bidder submits slower and larger bids later. 
Therefore, the weightings of  * and  2 highly results in 
many one-time bidders scoring high overall even 
though such bidders are clearly innocent.  
A bidder’s ζ weightings are also given two as it is 
not more influential than other bidding behavior 
ratings. Instead all the bidding characteristic 
weightings must be examined as a group to determine 
if the bidder’s bidding behavior fits the profile of a 
shill bidder.  
The LSS values in all stages of a live auction are 
between 0 and 10. The bidder with the highest LSS is 
the most likely to be a potential shill bidder. 
 
4. Experimental Results  
 
The LSS algorithm was tested on simulated and 
commercial auction data. The first test involved a 
series of simulated auction trials which were acquired 
from Trevathan and Read [15]. The second test 
considered commercial online auctions which were 
collected from Jank and Shmueli [6]. 
 
4.1. Simulated auctions 
 
Trevathan and Read [15] conducted a series of 
simulated auction trails to obtain auction data. The data 
contained thirty-nine auctions where each of these 
auctions was for a different item. All auctions were 
considered to be for one seller [15]. 
The auction proceedings involved twenty-six 
bidders. A bidder’s goal was to win while also trying to 
save his/her money. On the other hand, a shill bidder’s 
goal was to force a bidder into spending as much of 
his/her money as possible. Bidders were not informed 
that shill bidding was occurring. Furthermore, the shill 
bidder had no knowledge of how much money bidders 
had. 
There were two types of tests performed: (i) with 
one shill bidder, and; (ii) without shill bidding. The 
LSS algorithm was run on all of the tests to determine 
its effectiveness on determining shill bidder and the 
likelihood of it incriminating innocent bidders. Each 
bidder’s LSS was compared to a predetermined 
threshold value for a known shill bidder. The threshold 
values were different at four different stages of a live 
auction. For example, `UEFGHI for the early stage, 
`USTTHE  for the middle stage, `UHFVE for the late stage, 
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and `UabFH for the final stage. To experiment LSS 
algorithm on simulated auction data, we consider 
`UEFGHI  9, `USTTHE  8, `UHFVE  8, and  `UabFH  7. 
These values were obtained by experimenting with 
simulated and commercial auction data.  Earlier 
auction stages have higher thresholds to ensure that 
innocent bidders do not incur penalties due to the lack 
of evidence.  
 
4.1.1. Auctions with shill bidding. The first test 
involved ten auctions and sixteen bidders, including 
one shill bidder (i.e., ‘Shelly’). Table 3 presents the 
Shill Scores for each bidder at the end of the auction 
(as outlined in [15]). Table 3 shows that ‘Shelly’ is 
identified as engaging in the most significant price 
inflating behavior (i.e., ‘Shelly’ has a Shill Score of 
9.16).  
  
Table 3: Shill Scores for each bidder using 
Trevathan and Read approach [15] 
 
 
 
Although Trevathan and Read’s approach [15] was 
able to detect a potential shill bidder, their Shill Score 
algorithm does not work in real-time. Therefore, we 
chose to run our LSS algorithm on the same auction 
data to see how it would execute in detecting a shill 
bidder in real-time.   
To experiment with the LSS algorithm, we 
considered one live auction (i.e., Auction ID- 9) among 
the ten auctions and remaining nine auctions were 
considered as past auctions. Table 4 shows the LSS of 
each bidder from Auction ID- 9. ‘Shelly’ showed shill 
bidding behavior in each stage of the auction duration 
(i.e., consistently high scores (Figure 3)). This results 
in the LSS algorithm postponing the auction after the 
middle stage due to generating Penalty 2. ‘Shelly’ is 
then put on notice before the auction resumes.  
Therefore, the LSS takes actions against a potential 
shill bidder earlier as compared to [15]. 
Table 4: LSS of each bidder in the different stages 
of Auction ID- 9 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: LSS of each bidder participated in 
Auction ID- 9 
 
4.1.2. Auctions without shill bidding. The second 
test involved ten auctions held by a seller. There were 
18 bidders. To experiment our LSS algorithm, we 
considered one live auction and rest of ten auctions as 
past auctions. However, unlike the previous test no 
intentional shill bidding behavior had been engaged in. 
Table 5 and Figure 4 show the LSS of each bidder 
in Auction ID- 8. The test’s purpose is to gauge regular 
bidding behavior in the different stages of a live 
auction. Scores are consistently low for all bidders; 
therefore no real-time intervention is required. 
 
Table 5: LSS of each bidder in the different stages 
of Auction ID- 8 
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Figure 4: LSS of each bidder in Auction ID- 8 
 
4.2. Commercial auctions 
 
The LSS algorithm was tested on commercial 
auction data. We considered an auction listing of Palm 
Pilot PDAs auctioned on eBay [6]. We selected the 
PDA because of its popularity. The auction data was 
collected over a period of two months in 2003. The 
auction data contains 149 auctions across multiple 
sellers.  
We considered one auction as live (i.e., Auction ID- 
3023885982 run by ‘michael-33’) among 149 auctions 
and the rest of them were past auctions. To experiment 
the LSS algorithm on commercial auction data, we 
consider  `UEFGHI  6, `USTTHE  6, `UHFVE  6, and  
`UabFH  6. These values were obtained by 
experimenting with commercial auction data. 
Table 6 shows the LSS of each bidder in Auction 
ID- 3023885982. Figure 5 illustrates that ‘chimam’ 
showed consistent shill behavior (i.e., scores above 6). 
The LSS algorithm triggers Penalties 1 and 2 as a 
result.  Therefore, the LSS algorithm starts intervening 
in the auction at the end of the early and middle stages.  
This intervention could potentially prevent further bad 
behavior from this bidder. 
 
Table 6: LSS of each bidder in the different stages 
of Auction ID- 3023885982 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: LSS of each bidder in Auction ID- 
3023885982 
 
On further inspection, ‘chimam’ has participated in 
75% of total auctions run by the same seller (i.e., 
‘micahel-33’) which is suspicious (see Table 6).  
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work  
 
This paper proposed a real-time detection method 
for combating shill bidding in multiple online auctions. 
Our LSS algorithm aims to not only detect potential 
shill bidders in real-time but also to react to the shill 
bidding behavior as early as possible during a live 
auction. Therefore, this approach potentially reduces 
the monetary loss of shill bidding victims.  
We implemented the LSS algorithm and undertook 
some experimentation to determine how effective the 
algorithm is in detecting shill bidders in run-time. The 
first tests involved simulated auction data (i.e., real 
users with fake auctions).  These tests contained data 
for known shill bidding and also auctions with no shill 
bidding. The results show that the LSS was able to 
highlight a potential shill bidder during a live auction.   
Further testing involved using commercial auction 
data collected from eBay.  It was not known whether 
this data contained any shill bidders.  The results for 
the LSS algorithm were consistent with the simulated 
auction data. The algorithm was able to identify a 
highly suspicious bidder in run-time.  
Future work involves undertaking more comprehensive 
testing of the LSS algorithm in multiple auctions run by 
multiple sellers using a wider range of auction data. 
Additionally, we would also like to further develop our 
auction system for detecting and preventing multiple 
shill bidders from performing price inflating attempts 
with collusive groups in real-time. Further work also 
involves looking into the impact of imposing penalties 
on bidders and extending our proposal to look at 
concurrent auctions for the same item.  
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